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INTRODUCTION

In March 2009, the United States Supreme Court’s landmark
1
decision in Crawford v. Washington turned five years old. A few
months later, the consolidated cases Davis v. Washington and
† Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. The author is a
former Chair of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Evidence,
Professor of Law at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law from
1989 to 2000, and Associate Academic Dean from 1996 to 1998. I want to thank
the editors and staff of the William Mitchell Law Review for their hard work
throughout the year, with special thanks to my editor, Robert Ambrose.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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2

Hammon v. Indiana turned three. One can only hope that no
human toddlers have ever inflicted the level of disruption and
uncertainty wrought by these cases and their progeny, which upset
3
the application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
to hearsay evidence in criminal cases. In Crawford, Davis, and
Hammon, the United States Supreme Court created a serious
hurdle in prosecuting certain kinds of crimes, such as domestic
4
violence, elder abuse, and child abuse.
Investigators and
prosecutors spent years drafting policies and procedures to
increase the reliability of statements taken from alleged victims of
these crimes that were out of court or outside the presence of a
criminal defendant.
These investigation and interrogation
techniques were developed to comply with existing Supreme Court
case law and to increase the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Today, however, the more structured and careful investigators and
prosecutors are in collecting hearsay evidence, the more likely the
courts will bar the use of the evidence under the Confrontation
Clause, as interpreted in Crawford and its progeny.
Part II of this article briefly describes the Crawford debacle,
arguing that its “cure” was worse than the problem it addressed.
However, there is no point belaboring the issue because, as the
Court appears to be refining its analysis, it shows no sign of taking
another dramatic turn in the near future. Consequently, Part III
focuses on the most serious problem created under Crawford: the
prosecution of crimes involving vulnerable witnesses, particularly
crimes of domestic violence, elder abuse, and child abuse.
Focusing on the pragmatics of coping with Crawford, this article
suggests ways to overcome Crawford’s limitations on admissibility of
evidence and ways to exclude evidence that is no longer protected
5
by the Confrontation Clause after Crawford. This article takes the
perspective of a trial judge who must apply the law as it is given,
balancing the constitutional rights of the accused against the public

2. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
3. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. “[W]ithin days—even hours—of the Crawford decision, prosecutors were
dismissing or losing hundreds of domestic violence cases that would have
presented little difficulty in the past.” Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005) (citations omitted).
5. See infra Part III.B–C.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRAWFORD REVOLUTION
A. The Confrontation Clause, B.C.E. (Before the Crawford Era)
For almost two hundred years after the creation of the Bill of
Rights, there was relatively little commentary by the Supreme Court
or scholars on the application of the Confrontation Clause to
hearsay. That changed in 1980 when the Court decided Ohio v.
7
Roberts. In Roberts, the Court held that prior testimony given by an
8
unavailable declarant does not violate the Confrontation Clause.
The Court established a two-step test: (1) the prosecution must
“either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability” of the
declarant; and (2) if the declarant is unavailable to testify, the
prosecution must show that the hearsay had sufficient “indicia of
9
reliability.” The “indicia of reliability” can be established in two
different ways. First, sufficient reliability “can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
10
hearsay exception,” which the Court did not define. Second, the
prosecution can satisfy the reliability prong of Roberts by making “a
11
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”
In tacitly overruling Roberts, the Court in Crawford aimed its
12
most stinging rebukes at the “reliability” prong of Roberts.
According to the Court, it produced tremendous variation and
13
The “particularized guarantees of
uncertainty in application.
[the] trustworthiness” approach to proving reliability was not an
easy, bright-line test. In practice, courts avoided that route to
reliability, preferring instead to find that the hearsay had adequate
“indicia of reliability” because it was admissible under a “firmly

6. See infra Part III.A.
7. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Court moved toward the application of the
Confrontation Clause to hearsay in California v. Green, holding that a prior
inconsistent statement made during a preliminary hearing was admissible when
the same witness testified at trial but claimed to have a poor memory and was
otherwise uncooperative. 399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970); See also Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (applying the Confrontation Clause to the states).
8. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72.
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id. at 66.
11. Id.
12. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
13. Id.
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rooted” hearsay exception. Over the years, the Roberts reliability
prong became rather routine, as courts found that most of the
common hearsay exceptions were “firmly rooted,” including: prior
15
16
testimony, statements made by co-conspirators, spontaneous
17
exclamations (also called excited utterances), and statements
18
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. This everexpanding list of “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions made it quite
easy to meet the Roberts reliability prong. The Court never directly
clarified what makes a hearsay exception “firmly rooted,” except to
19
20
say that the age and popularity of the exception were important
factors. Evidence scholar folklore posits that a firmly rooted
hearsay exception is any exception the judge recalls from his or her
law school days. In fact, during the Roberts era, the Supreme Court
found only two hearsay exceptions that were not firmly rooted: the
21
residual exception and some statements against interest, insofar as
they amounted to an accomplice’s custodial confession that also
22
implicated the defendant.
Indeed, the Court’s recognition that only some “statements
against interest” fall within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception”
probably had more to do with the death of Ohio v. Roberts than any
14. Id.
15. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
16. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 172 (1987).
17. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992).
18. Id.
19. Bourjailly, 483 U.S. at 183.
20. White, 502 U.S. at 355.
21. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (applying Idaho Rule of
Evidence 803(24), which is Idaho’s version of Federal Rule of Evidence 807). The
Court held that a court must look for “particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness” when applying the residual hearsay exception. Id. The Court
further explained that such particularized guarantees of trustworthiness should be
found in the totality of circumstances “that surround the making of the statement
and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.” Id. at 820. Other
independent evidence corroborating the hearsay statements did not matter in
terms of evaluating the reliability of those statements. Id.
22. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (applying Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3)). The Court reasoned that such statements “are inherently
unreliable . . . because an accomplice often has a considerable interest in
‘confessing and betraying his cocriminal.’” Id. at 131. These statements are “given
under conditions that implicate the core concerns of the old ex parte affidavit
practice—that is, when the government is involved in the statements’ production
and when the statements describe past events that have not been subjected to
adversarial testing.” Id. at 135. Here, one sees the nascent development of the
“procedural” dimension of the Confrontation Clause. See Kirst, infra note 40 and
accompanying citations.
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23

other factor.
The only support Justice Scalia provided for his
argument that Roberts produced inconsistent or unpredictable
24
results were lower court cases interpreting Lilly v. Virginia. Lilly
was a plurality Supreme Court decision, a confusing mélange of
approaches to the Confrontation Clause problem. The justices all
voted to reverse Lilly’s conviction, but only three other justices
25
joined Justice Stevens’ opinion, which was based on Roberts. The
26
four other opinions provided four additional theories. It is not
surprising then that Justice Scalia was able to point to conflicting
lower court cases dealing with similar facts of confessions of
accomplices that implicate the accused and are offered under the
27
hearsay exception for statements against interest. Roberts certainly
had its faults, such as conflating the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rule, but it is unfair to blame Roberts for the confusion and
unpredictability generated by Lilly. In reality, the Roberts reliability
prong produced very little unpredictability or uncertainty because
most hearsay statements could be shoved into a “firmly rooted”
28
hearsay exception.
At the same time the Court was expanding the list of “firmly
rooted” hearsay exceptions, making it easier to satisfy Roberts’s
reliability requirement, the Court moved steadily toward
eliminating Roberts’s “unavailability” prong. For example, in United
29
States v. Inadi, the Court held that no showing of unavailability was
required to satisfy the Confrontation Clause when the hearsay was
30
The Court
admitted as the statement of a co-conspirator.
explained that unavailability was required in Roberts because the
statement was admitted as prior testimony, which requires
unavailability as an element under the terms of the hearsay
31
exception. The Court emphasized that the evidence produced by
23. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131 (1999).
24. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63–64 (2004).
25. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,
JJ.).
26. Id. at 140 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Scalia, J., concurring); id.
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 144 (Rehnquist, C.J. & O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment).
27. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.
28. In contrast, the confusion and uncertainty over the Court’s current
“testimonial” approach to the Confrontation Clause makes the Roberts’s reliability
prong looks like a bright-line test.
29. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
30. Id. at 395.
31. Id. at 393 (applying Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)).
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statements of co-conspirators could not be obtained through in32
court cross-examination. Finally, the Court stressed that, in the
case of co-conspirators, the benefits of the unavailability prong
would be insignificant, while the burden on the prosecution to
produce an unnamed, unindicted co-conspirator would be
33
Thus, the Court eliminated Roberts’s unavailability
substantial.
prong in the case of co-conspirators, concluding that “the
34
Confrontation Clause does not embody such a rule.”
35
A few years later in White v. Illinois, the Supreme Court simply
eliminated “unavailability” as a requirement of the Confrontation
Clause for all hearsay exceptions. As a result, unavailability was
only required where the terms of the federal or state hearsay
exception required it. In White, a case involving child sexual abuse,
the Court held that the child’s out-of-court statements, which were
admitted over hearsay objections as “spontaneous declarations”
and “statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment,” were firmly rooted hearsay exceptions and that this was
36
sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. It was not necessary
for the prosecution to produce the child in court or to show that
37
the child was unavailable to testify. The Court reasoned that if the
defendant wished to confront the child, the defendant was free to
38
Minnesota law differs on this issue. The
subpoena the child.
Minnesota Supreme Court established a practice that, when
requested by the defense, requires prosecutors to call available
child witnesses in their case-in-chief when child hearsay is being
39
admitted against the defendant
The Roberts decision fell out of favor with scholars long before
40
Roberts was widely criticized as
Crawford was decided.
32. Id. at 395.
33. Id. at 396–400.
34. Id. at 400.
35. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
36. Id. at 356 n.8.
37. Id. at 356–57.
38. Id.
39. State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1071 (1992). This approach is praised by Professor Myrna Raeder, who notes that
although this procedure “was not constitutionally based, it provides a model that
should be more widely enacted.” Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse
Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay and
Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1019 (2007).
40. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 125–31 (1997); Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the
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unpredictable, unworkable, and unprincipled, primarily because its
emphasis on reliability simply parroted the concerns behind the
41
hearsay rule, making the Confrontation Clause superfluous.
Given the hostility toward Roberts, it is not surprising that courts had
no trouble circumventing the Roberts requirements under the
Confrontation Clause in the vast majority of cases. “Unavailability”
was required only if it was an element of a hearsay exception; it was
not a constitutional requirement. A particularized search for
reliability was required only when statements were offered under
the residual hearsay exception and accomplice confessions
implicating the accused were offered under the hearsay exception
for statements against interest. But in the vast majority of cases, it
was not difficult to avoid those two hearsay exceptions by finding a
more “firmly rooted” exception. Because appellate courts have
always given trial courts wide discretion in deciding whether a
42
statement is admissible under a particular hearsay exception, the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV.
557, 558–60 (1992); Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40
HOUS. L. REV. 1003, 1054 (2003); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1013 (1998); Randy N. Jonakait, Restoring the
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 573 (1988); Laird
C. Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional
Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REV. 665, 667 (1986); Roger W. Kirst, The
Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485, 490 (1987); Toni
M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L.REV.
863, 870–71 (1988); Myrna S. Raeder, Hot Topics in Confrontation Clause Cases and
Creating a More Workable Confrontation Clause Framework Without Starting Over, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2002); Eileen. A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions
of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV.
623, 626 (1992); Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors: The Failure of the Supreme Court’s
Accuracy Rationale in White V. Illinois Requires a New Look at Confrontation, 22 CAP. U.
L. REV. 145, 181 (1993); Andrew Taslitz, Catharsis, The Confrontation Clause, and
Expert Testimony, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (1993).
41. Daniel J. Capra, Amending the Hearsay Exception for Declarations Against Penal
Interest in the Wake of Crawford, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2409, 2409–10 (2005);
Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 575 (1988).
42. The evidentiary rulings of trial courts are notoriously difficult to overturn
on appeal for reasons of judicial efficiency and deference to the trial judge, who is
generally in a better position to evaluate the evidence when it is offered than is the
appellate court, which only reviews the cold record. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 725
N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. 2007) (stating that “[w]e afford trial courts considerable
discretion in admitting evidence” and “review their evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of that discretion.”); State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Minn. 2006)
(stating that the “[e]rroneous admission of evidence that does not have
constitutional implications is harmless if there is no ‘reasonable possibility that the
wrongfully admitted evidence significantly affected the verdict’”) (quoting State v.
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Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Roberts, presented no
serious obstacle to the introduction of hearsay evidence against
criminal defendants.
At the same time the Court was discarding unavailability as a
constitutional requirement for the admission of hearsay in criminal
cases, there was a related development in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. Throughout the 1980s state and federal courts
began to grapple with difficult prosecutions for child sexual and
43
physical abuse. These cases are particularly difficult to investigate
and prosecute because of the problems of gathering and
presenting information from the primary witnesses to the alleged
44
Getting reliable in-court testimony from
crimes—children.
children was perceived as difficult because of the perceived limited
capacity of children to recall events that may be at least several
months, if not years, old as well as perceived inability to
45
communicate clearly about their experiences. Moreover, children
were frequently characterized as being so psychologically
traumatized by their abuse that they could not be expected to
testify in front of the alleged abuser without experiencing revived
46
or new trauma.
Lower courts attempted to cope with these problems, using
“low-tech” and “high-tech” solutions. However, the Supreme Court
47
struck down a “low-tech” solution in Coy v. Iowa, holding that the
trial court violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause right by
48
placing a large screen between the defendant and a child witness.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia applied his brand of
textualism to the Confrontation Clause, finding that “the
Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 n.2 (Minn. 1994)); State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203
(Minn. 2003) (observing that “[o]n appeal, the appellant has the burden of
establishing that the trial court abused its discretion and that appellant was
thereby prejudiced.”).
43. See Gail S. Goodman, Children's Eyewitness Memory: A Modern History and
Contemporary Commentary, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 811, 820–21 (2006) (discussing the
development of specialists in questioning alleged victims of child abuse).
44. Karen J. Saywitz, Gail S. Goodman & Thomas D. Lyon, Interviewing Children
in and out of Court, in The APSAC Handbook on Child Maltreatment, 349, 359–77 (John
E.B. Myers et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
45. Myrna S. Raeder, Enhancing the Legal Profession’s Response to Victims of Child
Abuse, 24 CRIM. JUSTICE 12, 19 (Spring 2009) (hereinafter “Legal Profession’s
Response”) (citing TASK FORCE ON CHILD WITNESSES, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUSTICE
SECTION, THE CHILD WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES 40–42 (2002)).
46. Id.
47. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
48. Id. at 1020.
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irreducible literal meaning of the Clause” is “[the] right to meet
49
face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.”
Yet the Court upheld a “high-tech” solution to the problem of
50
child testimony in Maryland v. Craig. There the Court held that “a
State’s interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child
abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in
some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in
51
court.” The Court ruled that if the prosecution can show that it is
“necessary to further an important public policy” and that “the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured,” the court may
permit a child witness to testify out of the physical presence of the
52
defendant through a one-way, closed-circuit television.
Two years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in White v.
53
Illinois eliminated “unavailability” as a requirement of the
54
White was a godsend to prosecutors of
Confrontation Clause.
child sexual abuse cases. After White, prosecutors could orchestrate
their proof more effectively. If a child was able to testify in person,
the prosecutor could present the child as an in-court witness. If the
child was not able to testify because the child would be traumatized
by the defendant’s presence, the child could testify via closedcircuit television. Further, if the prosecutor could not make the
required showing of the necessity for closed-circuit television, the
prosecutor could simply introduce the child’s out-of-court
statements implicating the defendant by having a parent, doctor,
nurse, social worker, or teacher repeat the child’s statements on
the stand. Of course, the defendant always retained the ability to
call a child to the witness stand if the defendant wished, even
though a criminal defendant has no obligation to produce any
witnesses on his or her behalf.
Craig and White also mark a temporary departure from Justice
Scalia’s textualist approach to the Confrontation Clause. The
majority in Craig reflects the moderate pragmatism of its author,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who tried to find a compromise
49. Id. at 1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
50. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
51. Id. at 853.
52. Id. at 850. Justice Scalia’s continuing interest in the Confrontation Clause
surfaced when he wrote the majority opinion in another case from the same term.
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
53. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
54. Id. at 354–55.
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between the right of the defendant to confront his or her accuser
and the need of the prosecution to obtain testimony from
vulnerable witnesses. Justice Scalia filed a vigorous dissent in
55
56
Craig and joined Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in White,
setting forth and applying their strict interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause to “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
57
Although Justices Scalia and
prior testimony, or confessions.”
Thomas failed to narrow the scope of the Confrontation Clause in
White, less than a decade later Justice Scalia became the dominant
voice on the Court on the meaning of the Confrontation Clause,
even though he had to moderate his textualist approach to do so.
B. The Confrontation Clause, C.E. (The Crawford Era)
As the author of the majority opinion in Crawford v.
58
Washington, Justice Scalia radically altered the application of the
Confrontation Clause to hearsay evidence by limiting its scope to
59
“testimonial statements.” Although the text of the Confrontation
Clause does not refer to “testimonial statements,” Justice Scalia
reasoned that it is the “testimonial” quality of the evidence that
makes a hearsay declarant a “witness against” the accused, bringing
60
the text of the Confrontation Clause into play. Drawing on his
originalist jurisprudential philosophy, Justice Scalia grounded this
interpretation of the text of the Confrontation Clause in the status
of the hearsay rule and its exceptions at the time the Bill of Rights
61
The Court held that the Confrontation
was adopted in 1791.
Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who
did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
62
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”
55. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 863 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (referring to the majority’s
conclusions as “antitextual”).
56. White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
57. Id.
58. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
59. Id. at 68.
60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 53–54.
62. Id. The only kind of hearsay clearly outside the Crawford test are those
statements qualifying under the “dying declaration” hearsay exception, where the
declarant is unavailable and describes the cause of his or her impending death.
Justice Scalia reasoned that because this exception existed at birth of the
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Justice Scalia refused to set forth a complete definition of the
term “testimonial,” leaving the development and application of the
term to countless trial court judges, who would, for the next two
years, have to make do with the hints dropped in Crawford. Justice
Scalia classified only one class of statements as obviously
“testimonial:” “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
63
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” The
Court did not fully explain what it meant by “police interrogations”
but did indicate that these interrogations involved “structured
64
The Court held that the evidence in
police questioning.”
question in Crawford was “testimonial” in this sense because it was a
tape-recorded statement obtained from the defendant’s wife, who
was questioned by the police while in their custody at the police
65
Because the defendant had never had an
stationhouse.
opportunity to cross-examine the witness regarding the statements
and because she was unavailable at trial under the marital privilege,
the use of the witness’s “testimonial” statements thus violated the
66
“new” interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.
Two years later, in the companion cases Davis v. Washington
67
and Hammon v. Indiana, Justice Scalia returned to redefining the
Confrontation Clause in the context of 911 calls and police
investigations in the field, two of the most common types of law
enforcement “interrogation.” Justice Scalia set forth a revised
understanding of “testimonial” statements in the context of police
interrogations:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
68
prosecution.
Confrontation Clause, this evidence was sui generis and need not be excluded even
if it is testimonial. Id. at 56 n.6.
63. Id. at 68.
64. Id. at 53.
65. Id. at 68.
66. Id. at 68–69.
67. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
68. Id. at 822.
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The facts of the consolidated cases illustrated the two different
scenarios. The Court held that in Davis, there was an ongoing
emergency because the complainant called 911 immediately after
69
Justice Scalia described these
the defendant left her home.
statements as not testimonial because the complainant was seeking
police assistance for an ongoing emergency and still faced a “bona
70
In
fide physical threat” because the defendant could return.
contrast, Justice Scalia concluded that the statement in Hammon v.
Indiana was testimonial because the complainant made the
statements to responding police officers after the officers separated
the suspect from the complainant; therefore, the emergency ended
when the police arrived on the scene and took control of the
71
suspect. Justice Scalia rejected efforts to broaden the category of
nontestimonial statements, noting that even if a 911 call began as
part of an ongoing emergency, it could become an effort to collect
72
evidence of a past crime.
In the three years after Davis, the two Justices who opposed the
shift in Crawford, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, left
the court. And there were two more notable Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause—one that drew a
73
bright line and one that did not. In Whorton v. Bockting, the Court
provided one of the few clear statements on the Confrontation
74
Clause, holding that its Crawford decision was not retroactive. In
reaching this decision, the Court stated plainly that, under
Crawford, “the Confrontation Clause has no application to
75
[nontestimonial] statements.” Nontestimonial hearsay could be
excluded under the state or federal evidence rules or other
constitutional provisions, but the Sixth Amendment no longer
provided a basis for exclusion.
Following this brief moment of (relative) clarity, the Court
blocked the path many courts tried to take after Crawford to allow
the use of hearsay from unavailable witnesses in domestic violence
and child abuse cases—the doctrine of forfeiture. The common
law doctrine of forfeiture is grounded in a principle of equity: a

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 817–19.
Id. at 826–27.
Id. at 829–30.
Id. at 832.
549 U.S. 406 (2007).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 420.
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person should not be able to profit from his wrongdoing. Some
jurisdictions, including federal evidence law, codified the concept
77
After Crawford, however,
of forfeiture in a hearsay exception.
prosecutors turned to forfeiture not as a hearsay exception but as a
constitutional principle, relying on dicta in both Crawford and Davis
to overcome the Confrontation Clause. In both cases, Justice Scalia
suggested that “forfeiture by wrongdoing” was a path around the
Confrontation Clause barrier because it was part of the original
78
Domestic violence
understanding of confrontation doctrine.
victim advocates and prosecutors argued that defendants in
domestic abuse cases forfeited their right to confrontation where
the defendants’ actions resulted in the unavailability of the
79
They argued that this was the only
witness/victim at trial.
reasonable response after Crawford, which made these cases difficult
to prosecute successfully. In domestic violence cases, the victim
and other witnesses frequently recant earlier allegations against an
accused and refuse to testify against the defendant at trial, forcing
the prosecutors to rely on pre-trial statements made by these
80
witnesses to police and other law enforcement officials. Crawford’s
holding clearly banned such “testimonial” statements where the
witness was unavailable to testify at trial and there was no prior
81
Thus, prosecutors
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
increasingly argued that a defendant whose criminal conduct
resulted in a witness being unavailable could not complain about
the lack of opportunity for cross-examination.
76. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1878) (stating that the
rule of forfeiture “has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted
to take advantage of his own wrong . . . a maxim based on the principles of
common honesty.”).
77. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
78. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
79. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 814–15 (Minn. 2005) (dictum)
(“In Minnesota, a defendant will be found to have forfeited by his own
wrongdoing his right to confront a witness against him if the state proves that the
defendant engaged in wrongful conduct, that he intended to procure the witness’s
unavailability, and that the wrongful conduct actually did procure the witness’s
unavailability”) (citing State v. Fields, 678 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. 2004)).
80. See Lininger, supra note 4, at 751 (summarizing some of the reasons why
witnesses to and victims of domestic violence recant or refuse to testify, including
“fear of retaliation, economic dependence on the batterer, and concern about the
possibility that the state would remove children from a household that has
experienced domestic violence”).
81. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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82

Finally, in Giles v. California, the Court found an opportunity
to clarify the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” solution to Crawford’s
83
However, instead of
hurdles in domestic-violence cases.
establishing a bright-line rule, the Giles Court splintered, producing
only a murky plurality decision. All of the justices agreed that
common law recognized a forfeiture doctrine that allowed “the
introduction of statements of a witness who was ‘detained’ or ‘kept
84
away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.” But the
Court could not agree on the standard for finding forfeiture. The
defendant in Giles was charged with murdering his girlfriend but
85
At trial, the
argued that the shooting was in self-defense.
prosecution introduced statements incriminating the defendant
that the victim had made to a police officer who responded to an
86
The California Supreme Court held that the
earlier assault.
defendant had forfeited his Confrontation Clause objection by
killing his girlfriend, regardless of whether he specifically intended
87
Yet after a thorough
to do so to keep her from testifying.
discussion of the historical treatment of the forfeiture doctrine, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine applies only where the defendant engaged in wrongdoing
88
with the purpose of preventing the witness’s testimony.
There were essentially three approaches in Giles. Justice Scalia
castigated those who criticized the consequences of his originalist
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence on the prosecution of modern
domestic violence cases, rejecting “a special, improvised,
Confrontation Clause for those crimes that are frequently directed
89
However, what Justice Scalia taketh away
against women. . . .”
with one hand, his other hand giveth. Although Justice Scalia
would require a showing of specific intent to make the witness
unavailable for the forfeiture doctrine to apply, he opined that this
showing could be met in many domestic violence cases when it
90
culminates in murder because of the “intent to isolate the victim.”
Justice Souter argued in a concurring opinion that Justice Scalia’s
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 2683 (Scalia, J.); id. at 2697 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2681.
Id.
People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 2678, 2682 (Cal. 2007).
Giles, 128 S.Ct. at 2683–84.
Id. at 2693.
Id.
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historical analysis of the forfeiture doctrine was inconclusive and
91
unconvincing. Nevertheless, Justice Souter joined most of Justice
Scalia’s opinion, fearing that without a requirement that the
defendant specifically intended to make the witness unavailable,
the forfeiture doctrine could bootstrap a finding of witness
92
However, Justice
unavailability into a conclusion of murder.
Souter suggested that the required showing of intent could be
93
Finally,
inferred by proof of a “classic abusive relationship.”
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy,
arguing that a showing of intentional misconduct should suffice if
the defendant should have known that it would prevent the witness
94
from testifying. Justice Breyer’s survey of the common law showed
that the requirement was only that “the witness’ absence was the
95
known consequence of the defendant’s intentional wrongful act.”
Justice Breyer’s most powerful comments come toward the end of
the dissent, as he points out that Justice Scalia and, even more so,
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion, created a type of presumption
96
in the case of domestic violence cases. The presumption is that
where the fact pattern falls into a classic domestic violence pattern,
there is likely to be the required purpose or design to make the
97
declarant unavailable and thus forfeit the right of confrontation.
Justice Breyer stresses that he agrees with this approach, but he
points out that it is more in line with his approach that requires
only a showing that the defendant knew the likely consequences of
98
He
his actions would make the witness unavailable to testify.
dissents only because the Justices refuse to apply the same
99
approach they would apply to domestic violence cases to all cases.
III. COPING WITH THE CRAWFORD REVOLUTION.
The clear losers in the Crawford upheaval are the courts,
especially the state trial court judges who are responsible for the
100
lion’s share of criminal trials in this country.
State trial court
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2694–95 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2695 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 2698–99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2701.
Id. at 2708–09.
Id.
Id. at 2078.
Id.
Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow? Domestic Violence Cases at Issue as
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judges struggle to apply the almost perversely cryptic formulations
of “testimonial hearsay” emanating from the Supreme Court to the
messy real-life factual contexts that trial courts face every day.
Thus, this section is for them, those overworked and underpaid
public servants who must somehow find a balance, however
imperfect, among: (1) the constitutional rights of the accused, who
are entitled to a presumption of innocence against even the most
heinous of accusations, (2) the interests of vulnerable victims of
physical and sexual abuse in having their abusers prosecuted and
punished, and (3) the interest of society in resolving disputes in a
criminal justice system that has integrity. Thus, taking the current
case law as we find it, here are some basic principles for handling
confrontation between a criminal defendant and a difficult witness,
such as a child, an adult with limited mental capacity, or a victim or
witness to domestic violence who refuses to cooperate.
A. Applying Crawford, Even with Difficult Witnesses
Five years after Crawford, how does one apply Confrontation
Clause to hearsay evidence? In a nutshell:
(1) Are the out-of-court statements “testimonial?” For
now, we know that testimonial statements include the
following: affidavits; prior testimony; stationhouse police
interrogations;
and
nonemergency,
investigatory
statements about past events taken by law enforcement
officials, including police and 911 operators. If the
evidence is nontestimonial, there is no Confrontation
Clause problem (although there may still be a hearsay or
101
other evidentiary barrier to admissibility).
(2) If the evidence is testimonial, is the declarant is
unavailable to testify at trial?
If the evidence is
testimonial, but the declarant testifies at trial, there is no
Confrontation Clause problem with admitting the prior
102
statements.

Judges Consider Which Evidence to Allow, ABA J., Sept. 2004, at 22, 22–24. But see,
Roger Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation Doctrine? 71
BROOK. L. REV. 35, 99 (2005).
101. See infra Part III.C.2.
102. See infra Part III.B.1. (discussing the “Warm Breathing Body” rule).
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(3) If the evidence is testimonial and the declarant is
unavailable to testify at trial, was there a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant about the statements? If
there was a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant about the statements, such as at a preliminary
hearing, then there is no Confrontation Clause problem
with admitting the statements.
(4) Do either of the two current exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause analysis apply?
a. Was the statement admitted as a “dying declaration?” If so,
the evidence is “sui generis” and thus not subject to the
103
Confrontation Clause.
b. Did the accused engage in conduct purposely designed to
prevent the witness from testifying? If so, the accused has
forfeited the Confrontation Clause objection by
wrongdoing.
If the statements are testimonial, the declarant is unavailable
to testify at trial, there was no prior opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant about the statements, and neither the dying
declaration nor forfeiture by wrongdoing exceptions apply, then
the evidence must be excluded under the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment.
Unfortunately, this summary of current Confrontation Clause
doctrine leaves plenty of unresolved issues, especially in the case of
domestic violence, elder abuse and child abuse. Determining when
a statement “testimonial” continues to be thorny. For example, if a
social worker, a teacher or a doctor, all of whom have a legal duty
to report child abuse, questions a child about suspected abuse, are
the child’s responses testimonial? Where is the turning point when
a police interrogation moves from dealing with an “ongoing
emergency” to investigating and collecting evidence of a crime? In
a domestic abuse, elder abuse, or child abuse situation, exactly how
much evidence does the court need that the defendant’s purpose
or design was to exercise control over his or her victim’s actions—
including the victim’s ability to testify to admit the statements of a
victim who is now “unavailable” (e.g., dead or refusing to testify,
103. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 55 n. 6.; see also Stephen J. Cribari, Is Death Different?
Dying Declarations and the Confrontation Clause after Crawford, 35 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1542 (2009).
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despite a subpoena)?
As much as I would like to resolve the quandaries about
whether such statements are testimonial, I am as frustrated and
befuddled as most of the trial courts that must resolve the question.
Thus, the remainder of this article sidesteps Crawford’s
“testimonial” framework and takes a different approach by turning
to evidentiary doctrines that have largely been ignored in the
excitement and confusion generated by Crawford, Davis/Hammon,
and Giles. These doctrines deserve far more attention because they
offer an opportunity either for overcoming the Confrontation
Clause objection or for excluding evidence even if it surmounts the
Crawford analysis. Whether one approaches the issue from the
perspective of the prosecution, the defense or the trial judge, in the
highly emotional and difficult context of domestic violence and
child abuse prosecutions, it is important to remember that
Crawford’s “testimonial” framework is not the only game in town.
B. Prosecution Strategies for Overcoming the Confrontation Clause
Objection
1.

The “Warm Breathing Body” Rule

Simply put: to avoid Confrontation Clause problems,
prosecutors and judges must work to do everything possible to put
the declarant (the person who made the out-of-court statement) on
the witness stand whenever possible. Putting a witness, who is also a
hearsay declarant, on the stand—even for a short time and even if
the witness will not or cannot cooperate or provide meaningful
information about the underlying facts of the case—eliminates the
Confrontation Clause objection to the use of out-of-court
statements by that witness. However, as discussed more below, it
will not eliminate problems of competency and lack of personal
knowledge. I call this the “Warm Breathing Body” rule, but in
naming it I do not mean to suggest I approve of it. It is a sad but
necessary way to cope with Crawford. As discussed more below, the
Warm Breathing Body rule applies even to children or other
vulnerable witnesses. Before Crawford, prosecutors frequently
argued that it was essential to keep children off the witness stand in
104
Yet child abuse
order to protect them from further trauma.
researcher Professor John Myers, states that “despite the difficulty,
104.

Raeder, Legal Profession’s Response, supra note 45, at 14 (Spring 2009).
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most children are able to testify in the traditional manner,
especially when they are prepared and supported through the
105
Empirical research also suggests that the outcome of
process.”
the prosecution has as much impact on the child’s well being than
106
Thus, it is especially important
whether the child testifies or not.
to understand the significance of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule,
especially when dealing with children, uncooperative victims of
domestic violence, and persons with age-related memory problems,
brain injuries, or other mental challenges. The origin of the
“Warm Breathing Body” rule is Justice Scalia’s opinion in United
107
States v. Owens. Justice Scalia summarized the facts:
On April 12, 1982, John Foster, a correctional counselor
at the federal prison in Lompoc, California, was attacked
and brutally beaten with a metal pipe. His skull was
fractured, and he remained hospitalized for almost a
month. As a result of his injuries, Foster’s memory was
severely impaired. When Thomas Mansfield, an FBI agent
investigating the assault, first attempted to interview
Foster, on April 19, he found Foster lethargic and unable
to remember his attacker’s name. On May 5, Mansfield
again spoke to Foster, who was much improved and able
to describe the attack. Foster named respondent as his
attacker and identified respondent from an array of
photographs.
Respondent was tried in Federal District Court for assault
with intent to commit murder under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a).
At trial, Foster recounted his activities just before the
attack, and described feeling the blows to his head and
seeing blood on the floor. He testified that he clearly
remembered identifying respondent as his assailant
during his May 5th interview with Mansfield. On crossexamination, he admitted that he could not remember
seeing his assailant. He also admitted that, although there
was evidence that he had received numerous visitors in
the hospital, he was unable to remember any of them
except Mansfield, and could not remember whether any
105.

Id. (quoting JOHN E.B. MYERS, MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC,
§ 3.01 (2007)).
106. Id. (citing Jodi A. Quas et al., Childhood Sexual Assault Victims: Long-Term
Outcomes After Testifying in Criminal Court, 70 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR
RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 88 (No. 2, 2005)).
107. 484 U. S. 554 (1988).

AND ELDER ABUSE CASES
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of these visitors had suggested that respondent was the
assailant.
Defense counsel unsuccessfully sought to
refresh his recollection with hospital records, including
one indicating that Foster had attributed the assault to
someone other than respondent.
Respondent was
convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment to be
108
served consecutively to a previous sentence.
To be respectful to Mr. Foster, who survived a terrible attack,
he was more than a warm breathing body. But his condition made
him analogous to one, at least when it came to recalling the facts of
the attack, including the identity of his attacker. In his dissent,
Justice Brennan notes that although Foster had no recollection of
the first time the FBI agent visited him in his hospital bed, Foster
109
described his memory of the FBI agent’s second visit as “vivid.”
However, Foster had no recollection of visits from other people
around the same time, including his own wife, who visited him
110
Moreover, Foster could not recall whether any of his
daily.
visitors, including prison officials, had ever suggested that the
111
defendant was the attacker.
The incongruous nature of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule
can be illustrated with a simple hypothetical. If Foster made his
identification in front of both the FBI agent and a nurse, but then
died, neither the nurse nor the FBI agent could testify at trial about
Foster’s identification of the attacker. It would be meaningless that
the nurse, who had no knowledge or memory of the attack, could
corroborate what Foster said in his hospital room. The defense got
no more from its actual cross-examination of Foster than it could
from cross-examining the nurse (or the FBI agent) about Foster’s
identification of the defendant. Only the fact that Foster took the
stand at trial (thankfully warm and breathing, but clueless as to the
circumstances of the attack) made it possible, in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, to use Foster’s hospital room identification of the
defendant as his attacker.
The Court in Owens reached its result by focusing on the form
of cross-examination, rather than the substance: “[T]he
Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective
cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 556.
Id. at 565 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 565–66.
Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/6

20

Scallen: Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and Other Challen

1578

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:4
112

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
All that is required is “that the defendant has the opportunity to
bring out such matters as the witness’ bias, his lack of care and
attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime
objective of cross-examination . . .) the very fact that he has a bad
113
memory.”
114
In State v. Holliday, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied
the “Warm Breathing Body” rule in upholding the defendant’s
murder conviction arising from a March 2006 shooting and death
of an innocent bystander in a popular entertainment district in
115
downtown Minneapolis. At the defendant’s trial, the State called
“A.A.” as a witness, who was allegedly the person whom the
116
defendant meant to shoot and kill. A police sergeant interviewed
A.A. in April 2006 and a Hennepin County prosecutor interviewed
117
A.A. twice, in May and September 2006. In those interviews, A.A.
118
At trial, however,
claimed to be the defendant’s actual target.
A.A. testified that he could not remember those conversations with
the police and prosecutor, even after reviewing the police
sergeant’s report and a report of his May interview with the
119
After reviewing another report from the September
prosecutor.
meeting with the prosecutor, A.A. said he remembered talking to
someone in the county attorney’s office but could not remember
120
what the conversation was about.
The trial court allowed the police sergeant to testify about his
121
In addition, the court allowed
April interview with A.A.
testimony from Jessica Immerman, a legal services specialist from
the prosecutor’s office, regarding the September 2006 meeting
122
Immerman, who was present at the
with the prosecutor.
September 2006 meeting between A.A. and the prosecutor,
testified that the prosecutor read a report of the police sergeant’s
April interview to A.A. and that A.A. acknowledged he made the
112. Id. at 559 (citation omitted).
113. Id. (citation omitted).
114. 745 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. 2008).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 561.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. On cross-examination, A.A. admitted that his regular ecstasy use
possibly affected his ability to remember. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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123

statements included in the report.
The court then allowed
Immerman to read into the record the report of the April police
124
Immerman then testified that the prosecutor read to
interview.
A.A. a memorandum the prosecutor made of their May meeting,
125
The court then allowed
and A.A. affirmed its contents.
Immerman to read into the record the memorandum of the May
meeting, which included A.A.’s allegation that appellant was
126
Finally,
chasing and shooting at him when the victim was shot.
the court allowed Immerman to read into the record a portion of a
memorandum summarizing A.A.’s September meeting with
prosecutor, which documented A.A.’s affirmations of the April
127
report and the May memorandum. The trial judge overruled the
128
The
defendant’s hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections.
trial court overruled the hearsay objection under the recorded
129
recollection exception and the residual exception. Although the
trial court found A.A.’s statements to be “testimonial” under
Crawford, the trial court overruled the Confrontation Clause
objection because A.A. testified at trial and was subject to cross130
The trial judge later convicted the defendant in
examination.
131
the bench trial.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s
convictions, resting its ruling squarely on Owens and dicta from
132
The Minnesota court acknowledged that Owens could
Crawford.
be distinguished from the case before it in that the witness in Owens
could recall making the prior identification, while in this case, A.A.
could not recall the conversations where he allegedly implicated
133
The Minnesota court, however, held that
the defendant.
Crawford’s direction was clear: “the Court in Crawford explicitly
stated in a footnote that a declarant’s appearance for crossexamination at trial removes all Confrontation Clause barriers to

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 561–62.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 559.
132. Id. at 565–67.
133. Id. at 566. The Court was referring to Foster’s hospital room conversation
with the F.B.I. agent, identifying Owens as his attacker.
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134

the admission of his or her prior statements. . . .”
Although the “Warm Breathing Body” rule is unpalatable,
especially as applied to its outer limits with an uncooperative
witness in Holliday one can understand the motivation behind it.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Owens, offered an alternative: he
would have applied the rule from Green v. California that “the Sixth
Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to engage in
cross-examination sufficient to ‘affor[d] the trier of fact a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of [a] prior
135
But one wonders how many and what types of
statement. . . .’”
questions asked on cross-examination would suffice to satisfy the
trier of fact about the truth of a prior statement? Justice Brennan’s
call for more than just an opportunity for cross-examination, his
demand for an effective and meaningful cross-examination, has
strong intuitive appeal, but it seems difficult if not impossible to
measure in practice.
In fact, Justice Brennan raised many of the difficulties himself
136
In that case, the trial witness had
in his dissent in Green.
previously testified at the preliminary hearing (where he was
subject to cross-examination) and identified the defendant as the
137
person who sold him marijuana. At the actual trial, however, the
138
witness was “markedly evasive and uncooperative on the stand.”
The Court held that the use of the witness’s prior testimony at the
preliminary hearing, for the substantive purpose of identifying the
defendant as the person who sold him drugs, did not violate the
Confrontation Clause where the prior testimony was subject to
139
In dissent, Justice Brennan questioned how
cross-examination.
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing in the actual case
could serve as a substitute for effective cross-examination at trial
where “defense counsel . . . did not engage in a searching
140
Moreover, Justice
examination” at the preliminary hearing.
Brennan questioned how the adequacy of the prior crossexamination could be determined in any case:
134. Id. at 565 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)).
135. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 565 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
136. See Green, 399 U.S. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 190.
138. Id. at 151–52 (White, J.) (quoting People v. Green, 451 P.2d 422, 423
(Cal. 1969)).
139. Id. at 168–69.
140. Id. at 191 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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[T]oday’s holding raises another practical difficulty: how
extensive must cross-examination at the preliminary
hearing be before constitutional confrontation is deemed
to have occurred? Is the mere opportunity for face-to-face
encounter sufficient? Perhaps so. The Court states that
‘respondent had every opportunity to cross-examine
Porter as to his statement’ at the hearing. Does that mean
that if defense counsel fails to take advantage of the
opportunity that the accused can subsequently be
convicted at trial on the basis of wholly untested evidence?
If more than an unexercised chance to cross-examine is
required, how thorough and effective must the
questioning be before it satisfies the Confrontation
Clause? Is it significant, for example, that in the present
case neither the defense nor prosecution explored the
most elemental fact about Porter’s testimony-the
possibility that he was under the influence of drugs at the
141
time of the alleged offense?
This was, in fact, the second time Justice Brennan faulted both
the prosecution and defense counsel for failing to question the
witness at the preliminary hearing about whether he was under the
influence of drugs at the time of the drug transaction with the
142
The message was clear: Justice Brennan would have
defendant.
conducted a different cross-examination, but the practical problem
is also clear. Once the Court starts to examine what was asked and
what was not asked during cross-examination, the Confrontation
Clause analysis becomes impractical.
The “Warm Breathing Body” rule allows for an unsatisfactory
opportunity for cross-examination, but tying the Confrontation
Clause to a standard of “meaningful,” “effective,” “full” or
“searching” cross-examination does not work either. However, as
143
discussed below in the section on taking evidence rules seriously,
this does not mean the trial court is powerless to exclude testimony
and prior statements of a witness who testifies that he or she has no
recollection of an underlying event. That evidentiary problem is
best dealt with as a problem of competency or lack of personal
knowledge of the underlying facts.

141.
142.
143.

Id. at 200 n.8 (citation omitted).
See also id. at 191 n.4.
See infra Part III.C.1–2.
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Improving Competency Determinations

The prospect of using the “Warm Breathing Body” rule, as is
the case with all aspects of confrontation, is most unpleasant in the
case of child or otherwise vulnerable witnesses. Moreover, it is a
difficult judgment call because in the case of children or other
vulnerable witnesses, the “Warm Breathing Body” rule frequently
overlaps with the concept of “competency.” As it has been
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the “Warm
Breathing Body” rule responds to the requirement of both some
hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause that the hearsay
declarant be available and testifying at trial and thus subject to
144
cross-examination.
“Competency,” in contrast, means more than just showing
up—more than just getting the declarant on the witness stand.
“Competency” is sometimes defined in different ways by state
statutes, but at its core, competency means that the witness (1) is
capable of distinguishing fact from fiction; (2) is willing to promise,
swear an oath or make some other kind of affirmation or assurance
that he or she will tell the truth; and (3) is capable of
communicating about the facts in issue. It is important to separate
the concept of competency from other evidentiary doctrines. For
example, when some courts or commentators talk about a witness
testifying “reliabily” or “correctly,” in all likelihood, they are not
talking about competency but rather whether the witness has
personal knowledge of the facts about which they will testify. It is
possible for a witness to sit on the witness stand and promise clearly
and intelligibly to tell the truth but not to have first-hand
knowledge of the disputed facts.
In addition to sometimes being confused with the personal
knowledge requirement, competency is confusing because it is
steeped in political and social prejudice. The common law was
obsessed with the fear that a witness might commit perjury. As a
result, “parties, spouses of parties, accomplices, persons with an
interest in the litigation, convicted felons, children, and atheists
145
“Incompetent”
were all at one time viewed as incompetent.”
meant that these individuals could not take the witness stand in a
court of law to testify about any subject, no matter how reliable or
144. United States v. Owens, 484 U. S. 554 (1988).
145. 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 6:2, at 1 (3d ed. 2008).
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knowledgeable the individual might be about the facts of a case.
These automatic disqualifications eventually were abolished and
became grounds for impeaching the credibility of the witness or
147
raised a ground of evidentiary privilege.
Today, both federal law and Minnesota law follow the modern
148
approach of competency provisions. Thus, a convicted felon can
give testimony but is subject to impeachment under Federal and
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 609. A spouse of a litigant or criminal
defendant may testify, subject to the spousal testimonial privilege
149
and the marital confidential communications privilege. Under
federal law, witnesses are competent “except as otherwise
150
provided.” This creates, in essence, “a presumption that everyone
is competent to testify, and in the case of ordinary witnesses (as
opposed to experts), the burden of showing that a particular
person is not competent to testify rests with the party challenging
151
the witness.”
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 601 also follows the modern
approach but states simply that at existing state law determines the
controlling principles of competency. The leading Minnesota case
setting forth the general principle of competency is State ex rel.
152
Dugal v. Tahash:
Determination of a person’s competency as a witness is
within the sound discretion of the trial court and is
ordinarily made by such preliminary examination of the
proposed witness as may be deemed necessary by the
court. If it appears from the examination that the witness
understands the obligation of an oath and is capable of
correctly narrating the facts to which his testimony relates,
the witness is competent in fact and should be permitted
153
to testify.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. FED. R. EVID. 601; MINN. R. EVID. 602; MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (2008). The
primary exceptions to these rules are the provisions that make a judge or juror
incompetent to testify as a witness in proceedings in which they are sitting. FED. R.
EVID. 605, 606. MINN. R. EVID. 605, 606. Minnesota expands that categorical
exclusion, with only a few exceptions, to any person “presiding at any alternative
dispute resolution proceeding.” MINN. STAT. 595.02, § subd.1a.
149. Id.
150. FED. R. EVID. 601.
151. MUELLER & KIRPATRICK, supra note 145, at 1.
152. 278 Minn. 175, 153 N.W.2d 232 (1967).
153. Id. at 177–78, 153 N.W.2d at 234.
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Minnesota has codified principles of competency, especially as
they pertain to children and vulnerable adults, in Minnesota
Statutes section 595.02, which provides in relevant part:
Subdivision 1. Competency of witnesses.
Every person of sufficient understanding, including a
party, may testify in any action or proceeding, civil or
criminal, in court or before any person who has authority
to receive evidence, except as provided in this
subdivision: . . .
(f) Persons of unsound mind and persons intoxicated at
the time of their production for examination are not
competent witnesses if they lack capacity to remember or
to relate truthfully facts respecting which they are
examined. . . .
(n) A child under ten years of age is a competent witness
unless the court finds that the child lacks the capacity to
remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which
the child is examined. A child describing any act or event
154
may use language appropriate for a child of that age.
Enacted in 1987, this statute reversed the legislative approach to
the competency of children and adults with mental challenges or
under the influence of mind-altering substances and created a
rebuttable presumption that such witnesses are competent to
155
In State v. Lanam, 156 the Minnesota Supreme Court
testify.
explained the purpose of a competency hearing after this change
in the law:
[The statute] does not mean that the court is to question the
child on the details of possible testimony, but rather means
154. MINN. STAT. § 595.02. In addition, Minnesota Statutes section 595.06
provides in relevant part that:
When an infant, or a person apparently of weak intellect, is produced as
a witness, the court may examine the infant or witness to ascertain
capacity, and whether the person understands the nature and obligations
of an oath, and the court may inquire of any person what peculiar
ceremonies the person deems most obligatory in taking an oath.
155. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 1(f), repealed by 1987 Minn. Laws, ch. 120
§ 1 (stating that children under ten years old are presumed incompetent to
testify).
156. 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn.1990).
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that the court should determine in a general way whether the
child remembers or can relate events truthfully. The jury will
judge the child's credibility and decide the weight to assign the
testimony. A competency hearing is not a credibility hearing.
Competency concerns the child’s ability to be truthful and to
understand the importance of telling the truth in court. It also
concerns the child’s ability to remember and relate events.
Whether a child is easily led goes more to credibility than to
competency. Even adults at trial become inconsistent upon
cross-examination. It is the jury’s province to sort out the
inconsistencies and determine credibility, the court’s province
to determine competency. Where the court is in doubt as to
the child’s competency, it is best to err on the side of
157
determining the child to be competent.
There is another part of Section 595.02 that can easily confuse
the competency analysis. Section 595.02, subd. 3 tries to provides a
“super” hearsay exception for certain out-of-court statements
“alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual
contact or penetration performed with or on” or any physical abuse
of the hearsay declarant. The statute makes the out-of-court
statements admissible for the truth of what they assert if the court
finds that the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement bear “sufficient indicia of reliability” and the declarant
either testifies or is unavailable, but there is corroborative evidence
of the act. The statute requires advance notice that the evidence
will be offered and expressly “includes video, audio, or other
158
recorded statements.” Although this statutory provision is placed
in the general competency statute, it is actually a hearsay exception
that incorporated the Roberts confrontation clause test, which was in
effect at the time the statute was created in 1987. It was intended
to provide an exception to the hearsay rule that would
simultaneously ensure the evidence passed the Confrontation
Clause analysis. It is not a competency test, for its last line
specifically states that “[a]n unavailable witness includes an
incompetent witness,” which sends us circling back to the
competency provisions of 595.02, subd.1(f) and (n), which
presume that a child or mentally challenged adult is competent to
157. Id. at 659–60.
158. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subd. 3.
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testify unless proved otherwise.
Crawford has now made this statute constitutionally suspect, at
least in part. Where the statement about sexual or physical abuse is
made in response to structured questioning by law enforcement
officials, it is clearly testimonial under Crawford. Thus, the only
route to admissibility of the out-of-court statements is to have the
witness testify, for Crawford prohibits such evidence where the
declarant is unavailable to testify and there has been no prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. One big area of
contention and confusion is whether statements made to forensic
interviewers (who specialize in child abuse investigation) and
statements made to professionals (such as doctors, teachers, social
workers who have a mandatory statutory duty to report such abuse)
159
fall under this category of testimonial statements. This issue will
ultimately have to be resolved by the United States Supreme Court,
but in the meantime, such statements are constitutionally suspect
even if they satisfy the reliability provisions of Minnesota Statutes
section 595.02, subd. 3, or any other hearsay exception. The
upshot is that in Minnesota, a child or mentally challenged witness
should take the stand unless proven to be incompetent under
160
Where there is doubt about the witness’s
Minnesota law.
competency, they are to be resolved in favor of having the witness
161
Having the witness take the stand cures the Crawford
testify.
problem, through the magic of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule.
Recent empirical research focused on obtaining more reliable
evidence from child witnesses suggests that courts are far too
162
reluctant to find that young children are competent to testify.
159. See Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D. Minn. 2008) (granting
amended petition for writ of habeas corpus in child sexual abuse case resting on
statements made to forensic interviewers and medical professionals).
160. In the 2009 Minnesota Legislative Session, legislators in both houses
introduced legislation to amend MINN. STAT. 595.02, subd. 3, to allow a child
witness to testify either in person or through “an alternative method under [MINN.
STAT.] 595.10]. See 2009 Minn. Senate File No. 563, Minn. First Regular Sess. of
the Eighty-Sixth Legislative Sess. (Introduced Feb. 9, 2009); 2009 Minn. House File
No. 720, Minn. First Regular Sess. of the Eighty-Sixth Legislative Sess. (Introduced
Feb 12, 2009).
161. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d at 659–60. Minnesota Statute 595.10 essentially
incorporates the Supreme Court’s decision in Craig. Thus, if Craig survives
Crawford, and if this legislation is ultimately passed into law, it would make it easier
to introduce all sorts of out-of-court statements by children, including testimonial
statements made to police officers and forensic interviewers.
162. Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young Maltreated Children’s Competence
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First, research suggests that trial judges and advocates may be
skewing the competency hearing results by the way they frame the
questions, especially those aimed at determining whether the child
is able to and will follow a moral obligation to tell the truth,
meaning that the child will reject false statements of fact. Professor
Tom Lyon, who has focused on developing protocols for
questioning children about abuse both during the investigatory
phase and during trial, explains:
[f]ar too often, children are kept off the stand not
because of their incompetency but because of the limited
competency of their interrogator. Children should not be
asked whether they know the meaning of truth and lie or
asked to define the terms. They should not be asked
whether they have ever told a lie. They should not be
asked hypothetical questions about the consequences of
lying, particularly hypothetical questions in which they are
the speaker (What would happen if you told a lie?). Many
children will perform poorly at these questions despite
being quite capable of identifying statements as true or
163
false and recognizing that lie-tellers are punished.
Professor Lyon and his co-author Karen Saywitz, from the
U.C.L.A. Medical Center, created a simplified competency
assessment tool that is available online for download without
164
The focus of the assessment is to determine whether a
charge.
child can determine and communicate that some statements of fact
are false. This assessment was developed because “even children
who have not learned labels for true and false statements are
165
The assessment is
capable of rejecting false statements.”
designed “to both minimize the difficulties children face in
defining and discussing the truth and lies, and to ensure that
children will not falsely appear competent due to guessing or
to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 3, 16–27 (1999), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=thomas
lyon.
163. Thomas J. Lyon, The Supreme Court, Hearsay, and Crawford: Implications for
Child Interviewers¸ AM. PROF. SOC’Y ON THE ABUSE OF CHILDREN ADVISOR,
Summer/Fall 2008, at 5, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1058& context=thomaslyon.
164. Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Qualifying Children to Take the
Oath:
Materials for Interviewing Professionals (May 2000), http://works.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=thomaslyon.
165. Lyon & Saywitz, supra note 44, at 5.
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166

following the questioner’s lead.”
Over the course of the
assessment, the interrogator asks whether there are bad
consequences for saying something that is false. The interrogator
poses four scenarios to a child involving the concepts of truth and
falsity and four scenarios involving morality. If a child answers all
four of the scenarios of each type correctly, “this demonstrates
good understanding of the concept (there is only a 6% likelihood
that a child would answer four of four problems correctly by
167
chance).”
168
The first four scenarios present the child with a cartoon.
The interrogator asks the child to look at a larger object toward the
169
top of the cartoon (for example, a drawing of a sleeping cat).
170
For example, if the child
The child is asked to name the object.
says, “that’s a kitty,” the interrogator then confirms the child’s label
171
The interrogator then calls
for the object, “Ok, that’s a kitty.”
the child’s attention to the lower part of the cartoon, where there is
a drawing of two boys, each one imagining (in a cartoon callout
172
cloud) a different picture. One boy imagines a cat; the other boy
173
The interrogator then tells the child, “LISTEN
imagines a dog.
to what these boys say about the kitty [or whatever label the child
174
One of them will tell a LIE and one will tell the
has used].
175
TRUTH, and YOU’LL tell ME which boy tells the TRUTH.” The
interrogator then points to the picture of the boy on the left side of
176
the page (who is imagining a cat). “THIS boy looks at the [kitty]
177
Then the interrogator points to the
and says ‘IT’S a [kitty].’”
picture of the boy on the right side of the page and says, “THIS boy
looks at the [kitty] and says ‘IT’S a PUPPY.’ Which boy told the
178
The next problem follows the same pattern, except
TRUTH?”
the cartoon involves two girls imagining two different kinds of food

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Lyon & Saywitz, supra note 44, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3–6.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and the final question is “Which girl told a LIE?”
These two
problems are followed by two additional problems, one of which
asks which character tells the truth and one of which asks which
180
character told a lie.
The final four problems involve “morality” tasks, which
evaluate whether a child understands there are negative
consequences for telling a lie. The first task puts two cartoon boys
in front of a cartoon woman judge. Here is the script for the
interrogator:
Here’s a Judge. She wants to know what happened to
these boys.
Well, ONE of these boys is GONNA GET IN TROUBLE
for what he says, and YOU’LL tell ME which boy is
GONNA GET IN TROUBLE.
LOOK [child’s name],
(point to left boy) This boy tells the TRUTH.
(point to right boy) This boy tells a LIE.
Which boy is GONNA GET IN TROUBLE? (correct answer
181
is boy on the right).
The other three scenarios are structured almost identically,
except that there is a different adult cartoon character in each
182
scenario who “wants to know what happened” to the children.
All of the adult characters are adult women, but one is “a Lady who
comes to visit these girls at home” (presumably a social worker or
183
184
Another character is a doctor.
The final
guardian ad litem).
185
character is “a Grandma.” The gender of the children alternates
186
between two girls and two boys. Note that these questions do not
ask the children to create abstract definitions of terms such as “lie”
or “truth.” The child is asked about concrete, visual situations, not
conceptual hypotheticals (for example, “What would happen to
187
you if you lied?”).
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 3–10.
Id. at 11–14.
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Children and mentally challenged witnesses without abstract
reasoning skill will have difficulty “swearing to tell the truth” in a
conventional manner, but this does not mean they are incompetent
to testify.
There are empirically tested ways of testing an
individual’s understanding of a moral obligation to reject untrue
statements of fact and to obtain the individual’s assurance that he
188
Trial judges should try to use these researchor she will do so.
based tools to determine whether a child can sufficiently
communicate in a truthful manner.
The determination of witness competency is left to the trial
judge; a reviewing court will only reverse the decision if: (1) it was
189
190
an abuse of discretion; and (2) it is not harmless error.
Trial
judges should try to assess witness competency to testify in a
thorough and age-appropriate manner, especially given the “Warm
Breathing Body” rule, which may make all the difference between
admitting videotaped forensic interviews or other kinds of hearsay
over a Confrontation Clause objection.
3.

More Craig, Not Less.

Another problem with vulnerable witnesses is that they may
experience trauma either from the adversarial courtroom setting
itself, or, especially in cases of alleged abuse, from the presence of
the defendant. The United States Supreme Court held in Maryland
191
v. Craig, that there are times when the right to confrontation
must give way to other powerful societal interests, such as
188. See also infra, note 273, which cites to other empirical research by
Professor Lyon and others on the best practices for interviewing suspected victims
of abuse both outside and inside the courtroom.
189. Minnesota ex rel. Dugal v. Tahash, 278 Minn. 175, 177–78, 153 N.W.2d
232, 234 (1967). Contrast this deferential standard of review with the more
stringent standard of review for alleged violations of the right to confrontation:
“We review de novo the district court’s determination of the protections afforded
by the confrontation clause, while we review the underlying factual determinations
for clear error.” United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted). And compare the more searching review of the similarsounding but distinctly different issue of competency to stand trial in State v.
Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 2007). If the issue is competency to stand trial, as
opposed to competency to testify, the appellate courts will do an “independent[]
review [of] the record to determine if the district court gave ‘proper weight’ to the
evidence produced and if ‘its finding of competency is adequately supported by
the record.’” 732 N.W.2d at 238 (citations omitted).
190. MINN. R. EVID. 103 (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . .”).
191. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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protecting children from additional trauma by testifying in the
192
The Supreme Court
physical presence of their alleged abuser.
held that one-way, closed-circuit testimony did not violate the
Confrontation Clause when: (1) the court determines that it is
necessary “to protect the welfare of the particular child witness;”
(2) the court finds “that the child witness would be traumatized,
not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the
defendant;” and (3) “the trial court [finds] that the emotional
distress suffered by the child witness in the presence of the
193
defendant is more than de minimis.”
Several courts and commentators have questioned whether
Craig is still good law after Crawford. Crawford expressly rejected the
balancing of constitutional rights against societal interests that
194
Craig adopts.
Moreover, Craig’s critics argue that Crawford rests
on a foundation of originalism. The Court purported to recognize
only those exceptions to the right of confrontation that were in
effect when the Bill of Rights was adopted. By this reasoning, a
process of testifying through one- or two-way video was not within
the imagination of the Framers, who emphasized “face-to-face”
confrontation.
By rejecting exceptions to the right of
confrontation, even those exceptions based on reliability of the
evidence, one might argue that the Court has implicitly overruled
Craig.
However, lower courts have not yet accepted this argument. In
fact, several courts have upheld Craig in light of challenges after
195
The reasoning of these courts is that if Crawford had
Crawford.
192. Id. at 853.
193. Id. at 855–56 (citations omitted). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 43, which was
amended to codify Craig and provides in relevant part:
In Open Court. At trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken in open
court unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, these rules,
or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. For
good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate
safeguards, the court may permit testimony in open court by
contemporaneous transmission from a different location.
The Eighth Circuit found this rule unconstitutional as applied in United States v.
Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005) because the district court found that the
child was afraid of both the defendant and testifying in the courtroom setting, an
inadequate showing of necessity under Craig.
194. Compare Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–68 (“By replacing categorical
constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to [the
Framer’s] design”) with Craig, 487 U.S. at 553 (explaining the need to balance the
right to confrontation against “other powerful societal interests”).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313–18 (11th Cir. 2006);
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overruled Craig, it would have done so explicitly. In addition,
Crawford is easily distinguishable from Craig. Crawford only decided
when the use of hearsay evidence at trial violates the Confrontation
196
Craig, in contrast, was not about whether confrontation
Clause.
was available to the accused but rather what form of confrontation
197
Moreover, some of these same courts note that
is required.
198
Crawford’s target was the reliability test of Roberts, which is not
implicated by Craig. Finally, Professor Myrna Raeder argued that
“Craig has not produced the parade of horribles that Crawford so
dramatically portrayed as justification for jettisoning Roberts.
Indeed, Craig has provided a sensible solution for an intractable
problem: providing cross-examination of abused children who are
199
traumatized.” This article argues that Roberts was not responsible
for the alleged “parade of horribles” attributed to it in Crawford but
rather the Court’s own incomprehensible application of Roberts in
200
Nevertheless, I agree with Professor Raeder that
Lilly v. Virginia.
the argumentum ad terrorem used in Crawford would not work to
overrule Craig. Craig is grounded in the pragmatic availability of
advanced technology and an awareness of the problem of child
abuse and has not generated the controversy and criticism
produced by Roberts. Even if Craig is still good law after Crawford,
the Court in Craig made clear that a child’s “trauma” or “emotional
distress” from the adversarial or courtroom proceeding is not
United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553–54 (8th Cir. 2005); State v. Henriod,
131 P.3d 232, 237 (Utah 2006); State v. Blanchette, 134 P.3d 19, 29 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006); State v. Griffin, 202 S.W.3d 670, 680–81 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); State v.
Vogelsberg, 724 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006); United States v. Pack, 65
M.J. 381, 383–84 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
196. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
197. Craig, 497 U.S. at 860.
198. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004).
199. Myrna Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World:
The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1016
(2007). Professor Raeder also cites empirical research that suggests that when
children are shielded, the jury may find the child lacks credibility, even if the
child’s testimony is reliable. Id. at 1018. She suggests that when a shield is used,
prosecutors should be able to introduce expert testimony to explain the presence
of the screen and thus counteract the non-intuitive conclusion that children who
have some kind of shield are less reliable. Id. Although Professor Raeder
acknowledges the Daubert problems with such expert testimony, she suggests that
the defense should be deemed to waive a Daubert (expert) testimony objection if it
implies or suggests that the child is less reliable because of the lack of face-to-face
confrontation. Id.
200. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
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sufficient grounds to dispense with face-to-face confrontation.
Such trauma or emotional distress, however, can be a serious
problem if it interferes with a child’s ability to communicate or
recall events. But researchers, child advocates, and criminal justice
specialists are trying to provide better guidance to judges and
prosecutors to help make the process of testifying less intimidating
202
Again, the key is to
and frightening for vulnerable witnesses.
making the child sufficiently comfortable and competent to take
the stand, thus invoking the “Warm Breathing Body” rule so that
the child’s out-of-court testimony can be introduced through other
witnesses.
C. Defense Stategies for Excluding “Nontestimonial” Evidence
203

The first three suggestions of this part of the article all allow
for greater admissibility of out-of-court statements, even where
those statements are “testimonial” because they all work toward
putting the witness on the stand to testify in some fashion.
However, a trial court needs to balance the right of the defendant
to exclude unreliable evidence along with the prosecution’s need
for evidence.
The reliability of evidence traditionally has been regulated by
the rules of evidence. As noted earlier, one of the strongest
objections to Roberts was that it conflated the Confrontation Clause
204
Thus, if a statement, other than one made
and the hearsay rule.
while testifying in the court proceeding, was offered in evidence to
205
prove the truth of the matter asserted, one could object that both
the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause were violated. If the
hearsay objection was overruled, however, one could generally also
beat the Confrontation Clause objection, especially if the hearsay

201. Craig, 497 U.S. at 838.
202. See Raeder, supra note 39 at 1013 (“Obviously, the reason for
incompetency is significant, since the inability to discern truth from falsity cannot
be immediately fixed, while the failure to communicate with the jury often can.”).
In a separate article, Professor Raeder called attention to a free but valuable
resource available online for download: American Prosecutors’ Research Institute:
Finding Words: Half a Nation by 2010: Interviewing Children and Preparing for
Court, http://ndaa.org/pdf/finding_words_ 2003.pdf (last visited May 18, 2009)
cited at Raeder, Legal Profession’s Response, supra note 45.
203. These recommendations include the “Warm Breathing Body Rule,” better
witness competency assessments, and increased use of shields where necessary.
204. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text.
205. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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exception was “firmly rooted,” and, usually, it was. Thus, under
Roberts, the problem was that by finding a “firmly rooted hearsay
exception” one usually got a “two-fer”: beating both the hearsay
rule and the Confrontation Clause objections. Crawford’s value is
that it has de-coupled the Confrontation Clause from the hearsay
rule. Now, even if an out-of-court statement may be admitted for its
truth under every hearsay exception known to humanity, it cannot
be admitted if: (1) the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify at
trial; (2) there was no prior opportunity to cross-examine the
hearsay declarant; and (3) the hearsay declarant’s statement is
206
“testimonial” (whatever that means).
But in the effort and confusion to learn and figure out how to
apply Crawford’s analysis, defense lawyers and trial courts sometimes
overlook important evidentiary issues that exist to screen out
unreliable evidence. Now that “reliability” is no longer the
207
concern of the Confrontation Clause, it is time to apply the
evidence rules with greater rigor.
1.

Taking The Personal Knowledge Requirement Seriously

One evidentiary concept that needs to be applied with greater
care is this: all witnesses, including hearsay declarants, must have
208
personal knowledge of the subject of their testimony.
This rule,
codified in Federal and Minnesota Rules of Evidence 602, has great
significance in the case of testimony from difficult witnesses,
including children. The requirement of “personal knowledge” is
closely related to, but not distinct from, the concept of
“competency.” Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick summarize the
key distinction as it is applied in court:
The judge decides whether the witness has made an
adequate oath or affirmation and can communicate with
the jury, for these are issues of “competency” under Fed.
R. Evid. 104(a), but the jury decides whether the witness
has adequate perception and memory, for these matters
are considered to be issues of conditional relevancy under
Fed. R. Evid. 104(b) and the judge plays only a screening
role, barring a witness from testifying only if there is not
enough evidence of perception and memory to enable a

206.
207.
208.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
Id. at 61–62.
See FED. R. EVID. 602.
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209

reasonable jury to rely on the witness.
Putting a warm breathing body on the witness stand—someone
who is capable of and understands the importance of rejecting false
statements of fact—may defeat both competency and
Confrontation Clause objections under today’s law. In addition, an
out-of-court statement may beat a hearsay objection through a
hearsay exception. Nonetheless, a trial court must still determine
whether the out-of-court declarant has a basis for knowing firsthand what he or she is talking about.
Although a hearsay declarant is a person who makes a
statement other than while testifying at trial, a declarant is as much
as witness to the truth of disputed facts as an in-court witness when
210
the out-of-court statement is offered for its truth. While a hearsay
exception may be justified because necessity or factors of reliability
substitute for the chance to cross-examine the declarant, there is
no substitute for proof that the hearsay declarant could see, hear,
touch, smell or taste whatever it is the declarant is describing,
explaining, commenting—and ultimately testifying—about. The
burden of showing that the witness or declarant had an adequate
opportunity to observe whatever he or she is testifying about is on
211
the party offering the statement, not on the objecting party.
Thus, where the court cannot determine whether the declarant
had first-hand knowledge, the court should exclude the statement.
Take the case of an anonymous 911 call, in which the caller
states that several light-skinned black men matching defendant’s
212
As with many hearsay declarants,
description are shooting guns.
there is no chance to consider the competency of the “witness,”
because the witness is not available to testify at trial. The statement
might be admissible under the excited utterance or another
213
Moreover, it might not pose a
exception to the hearsay rule.
Confrontation Clause problem under the “testimonial” framework
of Crawford and Davis because the caller was describing an on-going
emergency. Nevertheless, as the appellate court held in the actual
case, the trial court properly excluded the 911 call because the
prosecution failed to show that the caller saw who was firing the
209. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 145, § 6:2.
210. FED. R. EVID. 801(b)–(c); MINN. R. EVID. 801(b)–(c).
211. State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 832 (Minn. 1988).
212. Although it predates the Crawford decision, these are the facts of Brown v.
Keane, 355 F.3d 82 (2d.Cir. 2004).
213. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); MINN. R. EVID. 803(2).
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shots:
It is one of the most basic requirements of the law of
evidence that a witness’s report may be admitted only
where grounds exist for “a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter” to which the statement
relates. See Fed. R. Evid. 602. Ordinarily, such a witness’s
account may be received only when given in open court,
under oath, and subject to cross-examination. When the
witness’s declaration was made out of court in excited
circumstances, the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule permits the receipt of the out-of-court
statement, not under oath, and without opportunity for
cross-examination. But the exception does not obviate the
requirement that the declarant have personal knowledge
of the subject of his report. . . . An assertion of fact based
on conjecture and surmise, to which the declarant would
not be allowed to testify if called to the witness box, does
not become admissible under an exception to the hearsay
rule merely because it was uttered out of court in a state of
excitement. Where the People failed to show that the
caller saw who was firing the shots outside the Phoenix
Bar, the caller’s excitement cannot justify the receipt of
his statement based on surmise that light-skinned black
214
men wearing green coats were doing the shooting
This statement is as clear as one can find distinguishing the
requirement of personal knowledge from the requirements of the
215
“excited utterances” hearsay exception.
The Advisory Committee Note to Minnesota Rule of Evidence
602 is in accord with the federal approach:
The rule requires that witnesses have firsthand
knowledge. It does not specifically refer to the declarant
of a hearsay statement that is admitted subject to an
exception to the hearsay rule. With the exception of party
admissions, which are admitted as a function of the
adversary system (and are not hearsay under rule
801(d)(2) the Courts have generally required that the
declarant of a hearsay statement have firsthand
214. Brown, 355 F.3d at 90 (citations omitted).
215. Id. Unfortunately, the court was not as clear earlier in the opinion, where
it muddied the concepts of competency and personal knowledge: “To be
competent as evidence, however, the declarant’s factual assertion must rest on
personal knowledge.” Id. Courts often mingle archaic and contemporary
language but do so at the expense of clarity.
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knowledge, before the hearsay statement is admissible.
216
The rule should be read to continue this practice.
However, litigants and courts do not always pay as close attention to
the personal knowledge requirement.
In State v. Holliday, 217 the prosecution’s witness A.A. took the
stand despite his many failures to recall the facts relating to a
shooting in downtown Minneapolis. He testified that his frequent
218
A.A.
use of the drug ecstasy might have damaged his memory.
reportedly told the police in two different interviews that he was
the real target of the defendant’s bullets. The focus of the Holliday
decision was whether A.A.’s testimony violated the Confrontation
Clause. As noted above, A.A.’s testimony did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because of the “Warm Breathing Body” rule.
Moreover, the trial court overruled the defendant’s hearsay
objections and admitted A.A.’s out-of-court statements under the
exception for “recorded recollections” and the “residual
exception,”
exception
presumably
because
they
were
contemporaneously and reliably recorded or adopted by a witness
219
However, that does not mean A.A.’s testimony should
at trial.
220
have been admissible.
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the witness A.A. had
no recollection of the conversations he had with the police, or

216. MINN. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee cmt. (citations omitted). The
note’s reference to party admissions, which “are admitted as a function of the
adversary system,” contains a questionable conclusion about the lack of a firsthand knowledge requirement. Id. This observation may make sense where the
statement is a personal or adopted statement of a party-opponent because the
party can take the stand and explain the lack of first-hand knowledge; however, it
makes no sense in the context of vicarious admissions, where a party may be held
responsible for the statements of an agent or a co-conspirator who may be as
unreliable as any other hearsay declarant without first-hand knowledge. Because it
may not be possible to call the agent or co-conspirator to the stand for crossexamination or explanation of the lack of personal knowledge of the events in the
statement, personal knowledge should be required for vicarious admissions.
217. 745 N.W.2d 556 (Minn. 2008).
218. Id. at 561.
219. Id. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(5) (recorded recollections) and the residual
hearsay exception of MINN. R. EVID. 803(24) (2006) (recodified Sept. 1, 2006, with
MINN. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (2006) to form MINN. R. EVID. 807).
220. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of whether the
trial court erred in applying these exceptions to the hearsay rule, holding that any
such error was harmless. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d at 568.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/6

40

Scallen: Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and Other Challen

1598

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:4

221

later, with the prosecutors.
Although it is unclear just from the
appellate report, it appears that there was no foundation as to the
basis of A.A.’s prior statements that he was the defendant’s real
target, but there also was no objection on based on the lack of
personal knowledge. Thus, we do not know whether A.A. made
statements accusing the defendant of wanting to kill him based on
first-hand knowledge (by hearing defendant threaten him at the
scene of the shooting?) or on the basis of reports from others
(hearsay). Because Holliday was a bench trial, the Minnesota
Supreme Court might have found this evidentiary error to be
222
harmless, as it did the alleged hearsay errors. The court stressed,
however, that, at least as to the alleged hearsay issues, its decision
223
In the
might have been different if this had been a jury trial.
bench trial, the district court judge specifically stated that he found
A.A. to be not credible and did not rely on his testimony in finding
224
the defendant guilty. If this was a jury trial, then one hopes that
the appellate court (and trial counsel) would have paid more
attention to the need for a foundation of personal knowledge of
225
the underlying facts.
Sometimes an evidentiary objection, such as competency or
lack of personal knowledge, can have as much bite as the
226
Confrontation Clause. In B.B. v. Commonweath, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
finding a four-year-old child competent to testify in a sexual abuse
prosecution, reversing the defendant’s conviction, even though, as
227
The court held that the trial
in Holliday, this was a bench trial.
221. The Minnesota Court recognized that Owens was arguably distinguishable
on this ground, because in that case, the hearsay declarant/victim recalled the
prior conversation in which he identified his attacker to the F.B.I. agent. Holliday,
745 N.W.2d at 566.
222. Id. at 568.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. There was also an issue of competency lurking in Holliday. On crossexamination, A.A. admitted “that his regular ecstasy use possibly affected his
ability to remember.” Id. at 561. However, the opinion does not state whether
defendant’s counsel inquired further into A.A.’s ability to testify at trial or
objected on grounds of competency. Cf. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(f) (2008)
(“[P]ersons of unsound mind and persons intoxicated at the time of their
production for examination are not competent witnesses if they lack capacity to
remember or to relate truthfully facts respecting which they are examined.”).
226. 226 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2007).
227. Id. at 49.
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court should not have allowed the child to testify and should not
have admitted the child’s out-of-court statements to a nurse and
social worker, accusing the defendant of committing sex acts.
Kentucky’s rule of competency is far broader than either the
Federal or Minnesota Rules of Evidence, including a requirement
of personal knowledge:
(b) Minimal qualifications. A person is disqualified to
testify as a witness if the trial court determines that he:
(1) Lacked the capacity to perceive accurately the matters
about which he proposes to testify;
(2) Lacks the capacity to recollect facts;
(3) Lacks the capacity to express himself so as to be
understood, either directly or through an interpreter; or
(4) Lacks the capacity to understand the obligation of a
228
witness to tell the truth.
The Kentucky Supreme Court had trouble framing its holding
under this statute, debating whether the problem was the child’s
229
lack of ability to tell the truth or her inability to recollect facts.
Yet all of its examples express frustration at the testimony’s lack of
230
What makes this case unique, however, is
evidentiary reliability.
that the court also held that the child’s incompetency extended to
her
out-of-court
statements,
holding
“that
testimonial
incompetence of a declarant should be an obstacle to the
admission of the declarant’s out-of-court statements if the reason
for the incompetence is one which would affect the reliability of
231
Although the Kentucky court characterized the
the hearsay.”
evidentiary problems here as ones of competency, one could also
characterize the reliability problems here as resulting from a lack of
first-hand knowledge. There was evidence that the child may have
learned about sexual acts from pornography her mother possessed
as well as allegations that the mother had accused other relatives of
232
This does not appear to be a case where the
sexual abuse.
appellate court did not believe the child; rather, the court simply
did not see sufficient foundation from any witness (in-court or outof-court) that the evidence was based on first-hand experience
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. (quoting KY. R. EVID. 601).
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 51 (citing and adopting the view of ROBERT G. LAWSON, THE
KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK675 n. 53 (4th ed.2003)).
232. Id. at 48.
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rather than on other sources.
233
How might United States v. Owens, have been decided if the
requirement of personal knowledge had been considered more
thoroughly? Although the focus of the Supreme Court decision
was on the application of the prior identification exemption to the
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, the defense also raised
the personal knowledge objection in a motion in limine before
234
Based on the government’s offer of proof, the trial court
trial.
ruled that Foster, the in-court witness (and hearsay declarant), had
235
personal knowledge of the identity of his attacker.
However, the
testimony at trial did not match the prosecution’s offer of proof.
In trial, Foster testified that he never saw his attacker:
Foster testified that he was walking down an aisle “when I
felt an impact on my head . . . I looked down and saw
blood on the floor and I-Now, I don’t remember seeing at
this time-I don’t remember seeing the individual.” Foster
then said that “[t]he next thing I remember after
receiving the blow to the head is many days later in the
hospital.” Finally, Foster stated that he could not recall
“the person or persons” that struck him on the head.
None of this testimony suggests that Foster saw his
assailant. Indeed, it tends to suggest that he did not see
his attacker and thus had no personal knowledge of the
236
identity of his assailant.
The appellate court noted that although the defense had made a
continuing objection to Foster’s testimony on personal knowledge
237
The
grounds, the trial court judge never revised his ruling.
appellate court decided, in light of its ultimate rulings on hearsay
and constitutional grounds, not to reach the issue of the
declarant’s lack of personal knowledge regarding the attack and his
238
attacker.
The Owens facts are helpful in illuminating another source of
confusion—the difference between the lack of personal knowledge
of a hearsay declarant and the personal knowledge of an in-court
witness who relates an out-of-court statement. Foster (the declarant

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

789 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
Id. at 754.
Id. at 755 & n.4.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 755 n.4.
Id.
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and in-court witness) was attacked on April 12, 1982.
At trial,
Foster testified that did not recall seeing or talking to the F.B.I.
agent on his first visit to Foster’s hospital room on April 19, but
Foster clearly recalled telling the agent about the attack on his
240
The
second visit to the hospital, a few weeks later, on May 5.
appellate court stressed that Foster had personal knowledge of
what he told the agent in the hospital on May 5 (that Owens
241
Moreover, the agent also had personal
attacked him).
knowledge of what Foster told him on that date (that Owens was
242
However, neither Foster nor the F.B.I. agent had
the attacker).
243
Because the
personal knowledge that Owens attacked Foster.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and later, the Supreme Court, were
so focused on applying the nuances of the hearsay rule and the
intricacies of the Confrontation Clause analysis, they glossed over
244
the lynchpin of evidentiary reliability.
One of the reasons a court may treat the personal knowledge
requirement so casually is that the evidentiary rule requires very
245
minimal proof of personal knowledge.
For example, in Owens,
the government argued that Foster’s wounds were all in the front
of his body, thus suggesting that Foster must have seen his attacker.
The appellate court agreed that:
[T]he location of the injuries provides support for the
theory that Foster saw his attacker. On the other hand, it
is possible that Foster was looking down or away and was
taken by surprise when he was hit on the head; it is also
possible that his assailant wore a mask or other disguise.
Thus, the location of the injuries is not necessarily
246
dispositive.
The appellate court used an unfortunate turn of phrase here,
for the sufficiency test does not require the proof of personal
knowledge to be “dispositive.” Such a showing can be made with
247
circumstantial evidence. Under Rule 602, the judge serves only a
239. 484 U.S. at 556.
240. Id.
241. 789 F.2d at 754.
242. 484 U.S. at 556.
243. See id.
244. The requirement that a witness, even a hearsay declarant, must have
personal knowledge of the facts about which he or she testifies.
245. See FED. R. EVID. 602; MINN. R. EVID. 602 (requiring that evidence be
“sufficient to support a finding.”).
246. Id.
247. Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Direct proof of
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screening function of deciding only whether a reasonable juror
could decide that the witness/declarant had personal knowledge of
248
Nonetheless, the appellate court was
the identity of his attacker.
right to stress that in a criminal case, where the central issue was
the identity of the attacker, the judge, in performing the screening
function under Rule 602, must ensure that a jury will base its
249
It certainly
decision on more than speculation or imagination.
would not have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
exclude Foster’s testimony (as well as the F.B.I. agent’s
corroboration of Foster’s hospital room identification) on the
grounds that there was an insufficient showing that they knew the
identity of the attacker based on first-hand knowledge.
The same requirement of first-hand knowledge applies to child
250
witnesses and all other witnesses whether they testify in person or
251
When a witness/declarant provides
as a hearsay declarant.
testimony in a criminal case about the identity of a perpetrator,
courts should be especially careful about screening the source and
circumstances of the witness/declarant’s knowledge of the
252
perpetrator. In State v. Ferguson, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the trial court erred when it concluded that a hearsay
declarant’s identification of the shooter was admissible because it
was the declarant’s “conclusion based on what happened earlier

perception, or proof that forecloses all speculation, is not required. On the other
hand, circumstantial evidence of the declarant’s personal perception must not be
so scanty as to forfeit the ‘guarantees of trustworthiness’ that form the hallmark of
all exceptions to the hearsay rule.”).
248. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 145. See also FED. R. EVID. 602; MINN.
R. EVID. 602 (both requiring “evidence sufficient to support a finding”).
249. Moreover, the appellate court was clearly concerned about the impact of
Foster’s head injuries and potential suggestive comments and questions from
Foster’s many visitors—none of whom Foster could recall (other than F.B.I. Agent
Mansfield):
Foster may have named Owens as a result of statements made to him
during his hospital stay by one or more of his frequent visitors.
Certainly the subject of the assault was one likely to arise when Foster
and his friends or colleagues talked, and reports regarding the
progress of the investigation may well have been conveyed to him.
Unfortunately, as we have noted above, at the time of trial Foster had
no recollection of any visits by persons other than Mansfield or the
conversations that occurred during those visits.
United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
250. See State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 282–83 (Minn. 2003) (applying
personal knowledge requirement to hearsay statements from child declarants).
251. FED. R. EVID. 602.
252. 581 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1998).
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and it is his opinion which is permissible in this situation.”
The
court noted that the statement was offered under the dying
declaration exception and stated that trial courts should apply
especially stringent admissibility rules regarding first-hand
knowledge where the statement is offered to identify the
254
Thus, the court concluded that where
perpetrator of a crime.
“the declarant’s identification is simply a result of reasoning from
255
collateral facts, the statement should not be admitted.” Although
256
it
the court held that the trial court’s error was harmless,
provides a good example of the need to enforce the evidentiary
rule of personal knowledge for all witnesses.
2.

Get Serious About the Hearsay Rule and its Exceptions

One reason it is crucial to determine the basis of a witness or
declarant’s knowledge of the facts is that it may reveal another layer
of hearsay. For example, in the Owens case, F.B.I. Agent Mansfield,
who testified at trial did have personal knowledge, but his personal
knowledge consisted only of a hearsay statement (Foster told him
257
that Owens was the attacker).
While that made Mansfield an
acceptable in-court witness as to Foster’s prior identification, it
could not satisfy the requirement that Foster have first-hand
knowledge of who attacked him. Getting serious about the
personal knowledge requirement is the first step to getting serious
about the rest of the evidentiary rules, including the hearsay rule
and its exceptions in criminal cases. Trial courts and defense
attorneys must determine whether the witness has first-hand
knowledge or is the witness simply testifying about hearsay, or
perhaps even double or triple hearsay.
In narrowing the application of the Confrontation Clause to
testimonial statements in Crawford, Justice Scalia stated that the
States retained flexibility in developing their hearsay rules to
258
But this can only happen if
exclude nontestimonial statements.
we start to honestly and critically examine the rationales for many
of the most commonly used hearsay exceptions, such as excited
utterances, dying declarations, and statements made for purpose of
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 832.
Id.
Id. at 833.
Id.
Owens, 789 F.2d at 752.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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medical diagnosis or treatment. These exceptions share a common
reliability rationale, which allegedly provides an adequate substitute
for cross-examination. The hearsay declarant is presumed to be
reliable because he or she is not thinking about fabricating
evidence. In the case of excited utterances and dying declarations,
the declarant is presumed to be either not thinking at all (excited
utterances) or to be thinking of the next stop in his or her spiritual
journey (dying declarations). In the case of statements made for
purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, the declarant, who by
definition has some medical or psychological illness or injury, is
allegedly thinking only of getting better. Although it is always good
for a cheap laugh, evidence professors grow weary of teaching
generations of law students about the absurdity of these
259
Moreover, even if these rationales were grounded in
rationales.
reality, they only address the danger of insincerity and not the
dangers of memory, perception or communicative ambiguity that
will go untested by cross-examination when a statement is admitted
under a hearsay exception.
It is important to think about why certain hearsay exceptions
exist and how they relate to each other. For example, in State v.
Holliday, the trial court admitted the statements of a witness who
did not remember making them (or the underlying facts contained
in the statement) under the hearsay exception for recorded
260
However, all of these
recollections and the residual exception.
statements were in fact, double-hearsay. Under Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 805, multiple hearsay is not admissible unless each layer
of hearsay is covered by a hearsay exception. This common
evidentiary problem is not discussed in the opinion. The first layer
of hearsay is A.A.’s statement to the law enforcement officials (first
261
The second
to the police officer and later, the prosecutors).
layer of hearsay is the out-of-court memorials that the law
enforcement officers testified from (Sergeant Charlie Adams
testified off his own report of his interview with A.A.; a paralegal
from the prosecutor’s office testified off of Adams’ report and a
memorandum in the prosecutor’s file memorializing the interviews
259. See Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a
Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 651 n.10 (1992)
(collecting scholarship that is critical of the “excited utterance” or “spontaneous
exclamation” exception from 1928 onward).
260. 745 N.W.2d 556, 568–59 (Minn. 2008).
261. Id. at 560–61.
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262

with A.A.). To the degree that any hearsay exception applied to
those documents, it covered only the documents themselves
(assuming the proper foundation for the recorded recollection and
residual exceptions were laid), but not A.A.’s original statements.
No hearsay exception covers A.A.’s original statements to the law
263
Moreover, by allowing these law
enforcement officers.
enforcement documents to be used against the defendant (even if
they were only read into evidence), the trial court violated the spirit
of the public records exception to the hearsay rule, Minnesota.
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(B), which was more directly on point than
the hearsay exceptions offered by the prosecution. The public
records exception expressly excludes documents produced by law
264
enforcement agencies to be used against a criminal defendant.
Thus to allow the officer’s police report and the prosecutor’s
memos to be offered as recorded recollection or under the residual
exception was to allow an end-run around a key statutory limitation
265
of the public records exception.
This argument is not an attempt to embarrass or second-guess
a very hard-working trial judge, who may not have been presented
with these objections and arguments. Rather, it merely illustrates
that at times, the evidence rules do provide sufficient grounds for
excluding unreliable evidence, even though one’s first instinct may
be to gravitate toward the Confrontation Clause objection. Many of
the issues of reliability raised by the testimony of a child or other
difficult witnesses could be handled not only under the hearsay
rule and its exceptions, but also under the basic rules of relevancy
(401 and 403). Evidence of questionable reliability has little or no
probative value. Evidence with no probative value fails the
relevancy test of Rule 401. If evidence has minimal probative value
and passes Rule 401’s standard, it is still worth spelling out the
unreliability of the evidence. Evidence with little probative value is
262. Id.
263. See MINN. R. EVID. 805.
264. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(8) (excepting from the hearsay rule “matters
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, (but) excluding, however, in criminal cases and petty misdemeanors
matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel”).
265. Cf. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d. 45, 70 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
prosecution could not subvert limitation of Rule 803(8)(B) by using the more
generic business records exception, 803(6), which did not restrict the use of
business records in criminal cases).
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far easier to exclude under Rule 403 than would otherwise be the
case. If trial courts applied the hearsay rule and its exceptions to
see if their promise of reliability is meaningful in a given context
and used Rules 401 and 403 to exclude unreliable evidence, a trial
court might never have to reach a Confrontation Clause issue.
I am not suggesting that trial judges rewrite the hearsay or
other evidence rules. Rewriting the hearsay rule and its exceptions
is, of course, beyond the pay grade of state and federal trial judges
in their daily work, although they do have a fair amount of input in
266
the rulemaking process, at least at the federal level.
However, as
is stated in nearly every appellate decision touching on evidence,
trial court judges have great discretion in making evidentiary
rulings. One cannot imagine or understate the difficulty of
exercising that discretion when heinous crimes are alleged. But as
the Kentucky Supreme Court observed in a child sexual abuse case:
[t]here may be a temptation among judges to let pity for small
children who may have been victimized . . . overcome their
duty to enforce the rules of evidence. . . . “The rules of
evidence have evolved carefully and painstakingly over
hundreds of years as the best system for arriving at the truth.
They bring to the law its objectivity. Their purpose would be
subverted if courts were permitted to disregard them at will . . .
[O]beying these rules is the best way to produce evidence of a
267
quality likely to produce a just result.”
Even in the most difficult criminal cases, evidence law matters—
and maybe when it matters most.
IV. CONCLUSION
My last scholarly article about the Confrontation Clause was
268
Since that time, I watched the
published seventeen years ago.
pendulum swing from a Confrontation Clause that was little more
than a constitutionalized hearsay rule to a Confrontation Clause
stuck somewhere in the eighteenth century. The Court’s emphasis
on the evidentiary (reliability) dimension of confrontation in
Roberts made the Confrontation Clause superfluous when the
statement fit a firmly rooted hearsay exception. That was wrong,
266. See generally, Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing the Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 843 (2002) (describing the federal rulemaking
process and critiquing the political interests involved).
267. Commonwealth v. B.B., 226 S.W.3d at 50 (citations omitted).
268. Scallen, supra note 40.
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and I was one of many who said so at the time. However, the
current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is intellectually and
ethically bankrupt. It is used to exclude a videotape of trained
investigators questioning a vulnerable child witness whose memory
will only likely deteriorate with time. But it allows the use of
evidentiary statements made by hysterical, unavailable declarants
whose ability to perceive, recall, and communicate key facts is
questionable. Those key facts will not and cannot be meaningfully
tested by cross-examination when those statements are made to a
parent or other nongovernmental person outside the courtroom
simply because those statements are “nontestimonial.”
Until now, I have refused to write about Crawford and its
progeny, preferring to spend my time in the twenty-first century,
doing many continuing legal education sessions with state trial
judges, both in Minnesota and California. We work together to
understand, apply, and teach Crawford. But other scholars have
been highly critical of Crawford, arguing that its historical/orginalist
269
analysis is defective. Some wrote insightful articles attempting to
create legal frameworks or interpretations that would clarify the
270
Crawford
Crawford Court’s concept of “testimonial” evidence.
stimulated law student scholars to propose innovative approaches
271
Some scholars have
to the problems raised by child witnesses.
269. Thomas Y. Davies, Not the Framers’ Design: How the Framing-Era Ban Against
Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of
the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 BROOK. J.L. & POL’Y 349 (2007); Thomas Y.
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism
in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005); Randolph N. Jonakait,
The (Futile) Search for a Common Law Right of Confrontation: Beyond Brasier’s
Irrelevance to (Perhaps) Relevant American Cases, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 471 (2007);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions of Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219 (2005).
270. Ellen Yiang Lee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach
to Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729
(2008) (“providing an analytical approach to aid courts in defining an ‘ongoing
emergency’ in the context of problematic relationships”); Robert P. Mosteller,
Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall
Lead Them”, 82 IND. L.J. 917 (2007) (advocating that, among other ideas, focus
should be on the questioner’s purpose in determining whether a statement is
“testimonial.”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle: Domestic Violence and
the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006) (applying Crawford’s testimonial
approach in the prosecution of domestic violence).
271. Anna Richey-Allen, Note, Presuming Innocence: Expanding the Confrontation
Clause Analysis to Protect Children and Defendants in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 93
MINN. L. REV. 1090 (2009) (advocating the use of evidentiary presumptions to
facilitate the admission or exclusion of evidence produced through child advocacy
centers that investigate child abuse); Jonathan Scher, Note, Out-of-Court Statements
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written excellent articles suggesting, among other things, legislative
272
and other institutional law reform responses to Crawford. Finally,
as noted earlier, other scholars created or joined multidisciplinary
teams to analyze, develop, test (empirically) and critique methods
273
and approaches of handling child or other vulnerable witnesses.
There are signs that the popularity of Justice Scalia’s
by Victims of Child Sexual Abuse to Multidisciplinary Teams: A Confrontation Clause
Analysis, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 167 (2009) (arguing that the use of forensic interview
techniques produces statements that are nontestimonial in accordance with
Crawford and its progeny).
272. See Lininger, supra note 4, at 783–818 (discussing legislative proposals to
facilitate pretrial cross-examination in domestic violence cases, such as requiring
non-waivable preliminary hearings, special hearings for cross-examination, and
depositions, along with many other proposals to adapt the hearsay rules and
procedures for prosecuting domestic violence cases more sensitive to the unique
problems of proof posed by these cases); Myrna S. Raeder, Enhancing the Legal
Profession’s Response to Victims of Child Abuse, 24 CRIM. JUST. 12, 15–19 (Spring 2009)
(discussing many recommendations for the treatment of victims of child abuse,
including the appointment of guardian ad litem, so the child victim has more of a
voice in court); Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too 71
BROOK. L. REV. 311, 315 (2005) (advocating “evidentiary creativity,” with increased
attention to creating new hearsay exceptions when the declarant testifies using
expert testimony and prior act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
and its state counterparts).
273. Thomas D. Lyon, Speaking with Children: Advice from Investigative
Interviewers, in HANDBOOK FOR THE TREATMENT OF ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
65 (P. F. Talley, ed., 2005); Thomas D. Lyon et al., Coaching, Truth Induction, and
Young Maltreated Children’s False Allegations and False Denials, 79 CHILD DEV. 914
(2008); Thomas D. Lyon & Joyce S. Dorado, Truth Induction in Young Maltreated
Children: The Effects of Oath-Taking and Reassurance on True and False Disclosures, 32
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 738 (2008); Thomas D. Lyon et al., Reducing Maltreated
Children’s Reluctance to Answer Hypothetical Oath-Taking Competency Questions, 25 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 81 (2001); Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical
Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Livia L Gilstrap, Child Witnesses: Common
Ground and Controversies in the Scientific Community, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 59
(2005); Michael R. Keenan, Child Witnesses: Implications of Contemporary Suggestibility
Research in a Changing Legal Landscape, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 100 (2007);
Amy Russell, Best Practices in Child Forensic Interviews: Interview Instructions and TruthLie Discussions, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 99 (2006) (literature review); Paul
Wagland & Kay Bussey, Factors That Facilitate and Undermine Children’s Beliefs About
Truth Telling, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 639 (2005); Michael E. Lamb et al., Structured
Forensic Interview Protocol Improves the Quality and Informativeness of Investigative
Interviews with Children: A Review of Research Using the NICHD Investigative Interview
Protocol, 31 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1201 (2007), available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2180422#id398384;
Angela D. Evans et al., Complex Questions Asked by Defense Lawyers But Not Prosecutors
Predicts Convictions in Child Abuse Trials, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2009)
available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1057&context=
thomaslyon).
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originalism, as applied to the Confrontation Clause, is waning.
This article, however, took a different path by demonstrating that
there are many ways for prosecutors and defense attorneys to look
beyond the constitutional conundrums as they try their cases and
for trial judges to do what they do best by using their intelligence,
diligence and judgment to reach a fair result in each particular
case. Even if we are stuck with Crawford, we can cope.
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